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Abstract
The ability to model continuous change in Reiter’s temporal
situation calculus action theories has attracted a lot of interest.
In this paper, we propose a new development of his approach,
which is directly inspired by hybrid systems in control the-
ory. Specifically, while keeping the foundations of Reiter’s
axiomatization, we propose an elegant extension of his ap-
proach by adding a time argument to all fluents that represent
continuous change. Thereby, we insure that change can hap-
pen not only because of actions, but also due to the passage
of time. We present a systematic methodology to derive, from
simple premises, a new group of axioms which specify how
continuous fluents change over time within a situation. We
study regression for our new temporal basic action theories
and demonstrate what reasoning problems can be solved. Fi-
nally, we formally show that our temporal basic action theo-
ries indeed capture hybrid automata.
1 Introduction
Adding time and continuous change to Situation Calcu-
lus action theories has attracted a lot of interest over the
years. A seminal book (Reiter 2001), refining the ideas of
(Pinto 1994; Pinto and Reiter 1995), extends situation cal-
culus (SC) with continuous time. For each continuous pro-
cess, there is an action that initiates the process at a moment
of time, and there is an instantaneous action that terminates
it. A basic tenet of Reiter’s temporal SC is that all changes
in the world, including continuous processes such as a ve-
hicle driving in a city or water flowing down a pipe, are
the result of named discrete actions. Consequently, in his
temporal extension of SC, fluents remain atemporal, while
each instantaneous action acquires a time argument. As a
side effect of this design choice, continuously varying quan-
tities do not attain values until the occurrence of a time-
stamped action. For example, in Newtonian physics, sup-
pose a player kicks a football, sending it on a ballistic tra-
jectory. The questions might be, e.g., given the vector of ini-
tial velocity, when will the ball reach the peak of its trajec-
tory? Or, when will the ball be within 10% of said peak? In
order to answer these questions either a natural, or an ex-
ogenous (respectively) action, depending on a query, has to
be executed to deem the moment of interest for the query.
In other words, before one can answer such questions, one
needs the ability to formulate queries about the height of
the ball at arbitrary time-points, which is not directly pos-
sible without an explicit action with a time argument, if a
query is formed from atemporal fluents. In Reiter’s tempo-
ral SC, to query about the values of physical quantities in
between the actions (agent’s or natural), one could opt for an
auxiliary exogenous action watch(t) (Soutchanski 1999),
whose purpose is to fix a time-point t to a situation when
it occurs, and then pose an atemporal query in the situa-
tion which results from executing watch(t). Similarly, one
can introduce an auxiliary exogenous action waitFor(φ)
that is executed at a moment of time when the condition
φ becomes true, where φ is composed from functional flu-
ents that are interpreted as continuous functions of time.
This approach has proved to be quite successful in cogni-
tive robotics (Grosskreutz and Lakemeyer 2003). For exam-
ple, it has been used to provide a SC semantics for contin-
uous time variants of the popular planning language PDDL
(Claßen, Hu, and Lakemeyer 2007).
In this paper we study a new variant of temporal SC
in which we can directly query continuously changing
quantities at arbitrary points in time without introducing
any actions (either natural, or exogenous, or auxiliary)
that supply the moment of time. Our approach works in
a query-independent way. For doing so we take inspira-
tion from the work on Hybrid Systems in Control The-
ory (Davoren and Nerode 2000; Nerode 2007), which are
based on discrete transitions between states that continu-
ously evolve over time.
Following this idea, the crux of our proposal is to add a
new kind of axioms called state evolution axioms (SEA) to
Reiter’s successor state axioms (SSA). The successor state
axioms specify, as usual, how fluents change when actions
are executed. Informally, they characterize transitions be-
tween different states due to actions. The state evolution ax-
ioms specify how the flow of time can bring changes in sys-
tem parameters within a given situation while no actions are
executed. Thus, we maintain the fundamental assumption of
SC that all discrete change is due to actions, though situa-
tions now include a temporal evolution.
Reiter (Reiter 1991; Reiter 2001) shows how the SSA can
be derived in atemporal SC from the effect axioms in nor-
mal form by making the causal completeness assumption.
We do similar work wrt state evolution axioms, thus provid-
ing a precise methodology for axiomatization of continuous
processes in SC in the spirit of hybrid systems.
One of the key results of SC is the ability to reduce rea-
soning about a future situation to reasoning about the initial
state by means of regression (Reiter 2001). Despite that we
now have continuous evolution in a situation, we show that
a suitable notion of regression can still be defined.
We finally observe that, in hybrid automata, while contin-
uous change is dealt with thoroughly, the discrete descrip-
tion is typically limited to finite state machines, i.e., it is
based on a propositional representation of the state. SC, in-
stead, is based on a relational representation of the state.
There are practical examples that call for such an exten-
sion of hybrid systems where states have an internal rela-
tional structure and the continuous flow of time determines
the evolution within the state (Vallati et al. 2016). Our pro-
posal can readily capture these cases, by providing a rela-
tional extension to hybrid automata, which benefits from the
representational richness of SC.
In summary, wrt this point, our work may serve as the
spark that will bring together and cross-fertilize KR and Hy-
brid Control, getting from the former the semantic richness
of relational states and from the latter a convenient treatment
of continuous time.
The next section provides the technical background on SC
and hybrid systems. Section 3 presents our contributions to
the temporal SC, including a derivation of state evolution ax-
ioms and a definition of temporal basic action theories. Sec-
tion 4 illustrates the proposal on a full fledged example. Sec-
tion 5 studies regression. Section 6 compares with previous
proposals in AI and SC in particular. Section 7 shows for-
mally how hybrid automata can be captured by our temporal
SC. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper by discussing fu-
ture work.
2 Background
Situation Calculus
Situation calculus (SC) is a second-order (SO) language for
representing dynamic worlds. It has three basic sorts (sit-
uation, action, object) and a rich alphabet for construct-
ing formulas over terms of these sorts. Reiter (2001) shows
that to solve many reasoning problems about actions, it is
convenient to work with SC basic action theories (BATs)
whose main ingredients are precondition axioms and suc-
cessor state axioms. For each action function A(x¯), an ac-
tion precondition axiom (APA) has the syntactic form
Poss(A(x¯), s)↔ ΠA(x¯, s),
meaning that the action A(x¯) is possible in situation s if
and only if ΠA(x¯, s) holds in s, where ΠA(x¯, s) is a for-
mula with free variables among x¯ = (x1, . . . , xn) and s.
Situations are first order (FO) terms which denote possible
world histories. A distinguished constant S0 is used to de-
note the initial situation, and function do(α, σ) denotes the
situation that results from performing action α in situation
σ. Every situation corresponds uniquely to a sequence of ac-
tions. We use do([α1, . . . , αn], S0) to denote complex situa-
tion terms obtained by consecutively performingα1, . . . , αn
in S0. The notation σ
′ ⊑ σ means that either situation
σ′ is a subsequence of situation σ or σ = σ′. The for-
mula ∀a∀s′(do(a, s′) ⊑ σ → Poss(a, s′)), abbreviated as
executable(σ), captures situations σ all of whose actions
are consecutively possible. Every BAT contains a set Σ of
domain-independent axioms which characterize situations
as a single finitely branching infinite tree starting from S0
such that, at each node S, each branch corresponds to a new
situation do(A,S) arising from execution of A, one of the
finitely many actions, at S. Objects are FO terms other than
actions and situations that depend on the domain of appli-
cation. Above, ΠA(x¯, s) is a formula uniform in situation
argument s: it does not mention the predicates Poss, ⊑, it
does not quantify over variables of sort situation, it does not
mention equality on situations, and it has no occurrences of
situation terms other than the variable s (see (Reiter 2001)).
For each relational fluent F (x¯, s) and each functional fluent
f(x¯, s), respectively, a successor state axiom (SSA) has the
form
F (x¯, do(a, s))↔ ΦF (x¯, a, s),
f(x¯, do(a, s))=y ↔ φf (x¯, y, a, s),
where ΦF (x¯, a, s) and φf (x¯, y, a, s) are formulas uniform
in s, all of whose free variables are among those explic-
itly shown. (As usual, all free variables are ∀-quantified at
front.) In addition to Σ, the set Dap of APAs, and the set
Dss of SSAs, a BAT D contains an initial theory: a finite set
DS0 of FO formulas whose only situation term is S0 (and
possibly static facts without a situational argument). Finally,
BATs include a set Duna of unique name axioms for ac-
tions (UNA) specifying that two actions are different if their
names are different and that identical actions have identical
arguments. If a BAT has functional fluents, it is required to
satisfy a consistency property whereby, for the right-hand
side φf (x¯, y, a, s) of the SSA of each functional fluent f ,
there must exist a unique y such that φf (x¯, y, a, s) is en-
tailed by DS0 ∪ Duna.
BATs enjoy the relative satisfiability property: a BAT
D is satisfiable whenever Duna ∪ DS0 is (see Theorem
4.4.6 in (Reiter 2001)). This property allows one to disre-
gard the more problematic parts of a BAT, like the second-
order induction axiom, when checking satisfiability. More-
over, BATs benefit from regression, a natural and power-
ful reasoning mechanism, invaluable for answering queries
about the future (a problem known as projection). The re-
gression operator R is defined for sufficiently specific (re-
gressable) queries about the future, i.e. formulas without ⊑
or equality on situations where each situation term has the
syntactic form do([α1, . . . , αn], S0) and the action argument
of each Poss atom is bound to an action function. R[ϕ] is
obtained from a formula ϕ by recursively replacing each
Poss(A(t¯), s) atom by R[ΠA(t¯, s)], each relational fluent
atom F (t¯, do(α, σ)) by R[Φ(t¯, a, s)], and, for each func-
tional fluent term f(t¯, do(α, σ)) whose nested terms of sort
OBJECT or ACTION are uniform in S0, replacing R[ϕ] by
R[(∃y).φf (t¯, t, α, σ) ∧ ϕ|
f(t¯,do(α,σ))
y ], where A|BC denotes
the substitution of C for B in A. A seminal result (Theo-
rem 4.5.5, also p.73 in (Reiter 2001)) has it that D |= ϕ iff
Duna ∪ DS0 |= R[ϕ], meaning that regression reduces SO
entailment to FO entailment by compiling dynamic aspects
of the theory into the query.
To accommodate time, Reiter adds a temporal argument
to all action functions and introduces two special function
symbols. The symbol time : ACTION 7→ TIME is used to
access the time of occurrence of an action via its term and is
specified by an axiom time(A(x¯, t)) = t (included in DS0 )
for every action functionA(x¯, t) in the alphabet of the BAT.
The symbol start : SITUATION 7→ TIME is used to ac-
cess the starting time of situation s and is specified by the
new foundational axiom start(do(a, s)) = time(a). The
starting time of S0 is not enforced, and the time points con-
stituting the timeline with dense linear order are assumed
to always have the standard interpretation (along with +,
<, etc.). To outlaw temporal paradoxes, the abbreviation
executable(s) is redefined as
∀a, s′.do(a, s′)⊑s→ (Poss(a, s′) ∧ start(s′)≤ time(a)).
Another useful notion is that of natural actions — non-
agent actions that occur spontaneously as soon as their
precondition is satisfied. Such actions are marked using
the predicate symbol natural as a part of DS0 , e.g.,
natural(bounce(ball1, t)), and their semantics are encoded
by a further modification of executable(s). We use natural
actions to induce relational change based on the values of
the continuous quantities.
Hybrid Systems
Hybrid automata are mathematical models used ubiqui-
tously in control theory for analyzing dynamic systems
which exhibit both discrete and continuous dynamics.
(Davoren and Nerode 2000) define a basic hybrid automa-
ton (HA) as a system H consisting of:
– a finite set Q of discrete states;
– a transition relation E ⊆ Q ×Q;
– a continuous state spaceX ⊆ Rn;
– for each q ∈ Q, a flow function ϕq : X × R 7→ X and a
set Invq ⊆ X called the domain of permitted evolution;
– for each (q, q′) ∈ E, a reset relation Rq,q′ ⊆ X ×P(X).
– a set Init ⊆ ∪q∈Q({q} × Invq) of initial states.
Like a discrete automaton, a HA has discrete states and a
state transition graph, but within each discrete state its con-
tinuous state evolves according to a particular flow, e.g.,
it can be an (implicit) solution to a system of differential
equations. The domain of permitted evolution delineates the
boundaries which the continuous state X of the automa-
ton cannot cross while in state q, i.e., ϕq(X, t) ∈ Invq .
The reset relation helps to model discontinuous jumps in the
value of the continuous state which accompany discrete state
switching.
A trajectory of a hybrid automaton H is a sequence η =
〈∆i, qi, νi〉i∈I , with I = {1, 2, . . .}, such that for each i ∈ I:
(a) the duration∆i ∈ R
+ ∪ {∞}, with∆i=∞ only if I is
finite and i= |I|, the number of elements in I;
(b) qi ∈ Q;
(c) νi : [0,∆i] 7→ X is a continuous curve along the flow
ϕqi that lies entirely inside Invqi ;
(d) (q1, ν1(0)) ∈ Init;
(e) if i < |I|, then (qi, qi+1) ∈ E and (νi(∆i), νi+1(0)) ∈
Rqi,qi+1.
A trajectory captures an instance of a legal evolution of a
hybrid automaton over time. Duration∆i is simply the time
spent by the automaton in the i-th discrete state it reaches
while legally travelling through the transition graph, obey-
ing the reset relation. The duration can be infinite if the au-
tomaton remains in the final discrete state qi indefinitely and
the evolution of the continuous state within qi, as described
by the function νi, never leaves the allowed domain Invqi .
A trajectory is finite if it contains a finite number |I| of steps
and the sum of all durations, Σi∈I∆i, is finite.
3 Hybrid Temporal Situation Calculus
In our quest for a hybrid temporal SC, we reuse the tempo-
ral machinery introduced into BATs by Reiter, namely: all
action symbols have a temporal argument and the functions
time and start are axiomatized as described above. We pre-
serve atemporal fluents, but no longer use them to model
continuously varying physical quantities. Rather, atemporal
fluents serve to specify the context in which continuous pro-
cesses operate. For example, the fluent Falling(b, s) holds
if a ball b is in the process of falling in situation s, indicat-
ing that, for the duration of s, the position of the ball (and
its derivatives) should be changing as a function of time ac-
cording to the equations of free fall. The fluentFalling(b, s)
may be directly affected by instantaneous actions drop(b, t)
(ball begins to fall at the moment of time t) and catch(b, t)
(ball stops at t), but the effect of these actions on the position
of the ball comes about only indirectly, by changing the con-
text of a continuous trajectory and thus switching the contin-
uous trajectory that the ball can follow. More specifically, a
falling ball is one context, and a ball at rest is another.
In a general case, there are finitely many (parametrized)
context types which are pairwise mutually exclusive when
their parameters are appropriately fixed, and each context
type is characterized by its own continuous function that de-
termines how a physical quantity changes.
To model continuously varying physical quantities, we in-
troduce new functional fluents with a temporal argument.
We imagine that these fluents can change with time, and not
only as a direct effect of instantaneous actions. For example,
for the context where the ball is falling, the velocity of the
ball at time t represented by fluent vel(b, t, s) can be speci-
fied as
[Falling(b, s)∧ y = vel(b, start(s), s)−g ·(t−start(s))]
→ vel(b, t, s)=y.
Notice that this effect axiom does not mention actions and
describes the evolution of vel within a single situation.
Formally, we augment SC with appropriate sorts to rep-
resent real-valued time, real-valued physical quantities, and
accordingly extend the sets of predicate and function sym-
bols of the language.
Deriving State Evolution Axioms
Our starting point is a temporal change axiom (TCA) which
describes a single law governing the evolution of a particular
temporal fluent due to the passage of time in a particular
context of an arbitrary situation. An example of a TCA was
given above for vel(b, t, s). We assume that a TCA for a
temporal functional fluent f has the general syntactic form
γ(x¯, s) ∧ δ(x¯, y, t, s)→ f(x¯, t, s)=y, (1)
where t, s, x¯, y are variables and γ(x¯, s), δ(x¯, y, t, s) are
formulas uniform in s whose free variables are among those
explicitly shown. We call γ(x¯, s) the context as it specifies
the condition under which the formula δ(x¯, y, t, s) is to be
used to compute the value of fluent f at time t. Note that
contexts are time-independent. The formula δ(x¯, y, t, s)may
define y implicitly or explicitly using arbitrary computable
domain-specific constraints (algebraic, differential, logical)
on variables and fluents. This formula δ may encode differ-
ential equations, and if they do not have exact closed-form
analytic solution, then value of y is to be computed numeri-
cally.
A set of k temporal change axioms for some fluent f can
be equivalently expressed as an axiom of the form
Φ(x¯, y, t, s)→ f(x¯, t, s)=y, (2)
where Φ(x¯, y, t, s) is
∨
1≤i≤k(γi(x¯, s) ∧ δi(x¯, y, t, s)). We
additionally require that the background theory entails
Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∧ Φ(x¯, y′, t, s)→ y=y′. (3)
Condition (3) guarantees the consistency of the axiom (2)
by preventing a continuous quantity from having more than
one value at any moment of time. With condition (3), we can
assume w.l.o.g. that all contexts in the given set of TCA are
pairwise mutually exclusive wrt the background theory D.
Having combined all laws which govern the evolution of
f with time into a single axiom (2), we can make a causal
completeness assumption: there are no other conditions un-
der which the value of f can change in s from its initial value
at start(s) as a function of t. We capture this assumption
formally by the explanation closure axiom
f(x¯, t, s) 6= f(x¯, start(s), s)→ ∃yΦ(x¯, y, t, s). (4)
Theorem 1. Let for each formula of the form (1) the back-
ground theory D entail ∀(γ(x¯, s) → ∃y δ(x¯, y, t, s)). Then
the conjunction of axioms (2), (4) in the models of (3) are
logically equivalent to
f(x¯, t, s)=y ↔ [Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∨
y=f(x¯, start(s), s) ∧ ¬Ψ(x¯, y, t, s)],
(5)
where Ψ(x¯, s) denotes
∨
1≤i≤k γi(x¯, s).
Proof. Full proof is provided in the Appendix.
We call the formula (5) a state evolution axiom (SEA) for
the fluent f . Note what the SEA says: f evolves with time
during s according to some law whose context is realized
in s or stays constant if no context is realized. Our causal
completeness assumption (4) applies both to physical quan-
tities and to their derivatives. This assumption simply states
that all reasons for change have been already accounted for
in (2), nothing is missed. It is important to realize that Dse,
a set of SEAs, complements the SSAs that are derived in
(Reiter 1991) using similar technique.
Temporal Basic Action Theories
The SEA for some temporal fluent f does not completely
specify the behaviour of f because it talks only about change
within a single situation s. To complete the picture, we need
a SSA describing how the value of f changes (or does
not change) when an action is performed. A straightfor-
ward way to accomplish this would be by an axiom which
would enforce continuity, e.g., f(x¯, time(a), do(a, s)) =
f(x¯, time(a), s). However, this choice would preclude the
ability to model action-induced discontinuous jumps in the
value of the continuously varying quantities or their deriva-
tives, such as the sudden change of acceleration from 0 to
−9.8m/s2 when an object is dropped. To circumvent this
limitation, for each temporal functional fluent f(x¯, t, s), we
introduce an auxiliary atemporal functional fluent finit(x¯, s)
whose value in s represents the value of the physical quantity
modelled by f in s at the time instant start(s). We axioma-
tize finit using a SSA derived from the axioms
e(x¯, y, a, s)→ finit(x¯, do(a, s)) = y,
¬∃y(e(x¯, y, a, s))→ finit(x¯, do(a, s))=f(x¯, time(a), s),
where the former is a Reiter’s effect axiom in normal form
and the latter asserts that if no relevant effect is invoked by
the action a, finit assumes the most recent value of the con-
tinuously evolving fluent f . This latter axiom enforces tem-
poral continuity in the value of f in the case when there is
no reason for change.
The SSA for finit has the general syntactic form
finit(x¯, do(a, s))=y ↔ Ω(x¯, y, a, s), (6)
where Ω(x¯, y, a, s) is a formula uniform in s whose purpose
is to describe how the initial value of f in do(a, s) relates
to its value at the same time instant in s (i.e., prior to a). To
establish a consistent relationship between temporal fluents
and their atemporal init-counterparts, we require that, in an
arbitrary situation, the continuous evolution of each tempo-
ral fluent f starts with the value computed for finit by its
successor state axiom.
A temporal basic action theory is a collection of axioms
D = Σ ∪ Dss ∪ Dap ∪ Duna ∪ DS0 ∪ Dse such that
1. Every action symbol mentioned in D is temporal;
2. Σ ∪ Dss ∪ Dap ∪ Duna ∪ DS0 constitutes a BAT as per
Definition 4.4.5 in (Reiter 2001);
3. Dse is a set of state evolution axioms of the form
f(x¯, t, s)=y ↔ ψf (x¯, t, y, s) (7)
where ψf (x¯, t, y, s) is uniform in s, such that for every
temporal functional fluent f in Dse, Dss contains an ad-
ditional SSA of the form (6) for finit;
4. For each SEA of the form (7), the following consistency
properties hold:
Duna ∪ DS0 |=
∀x¯∀t. ∃y(ψf (x¯, t, y, s)) ∧
∀y∀y′(ψf (x¯, t, y, s) ∧ ψf (x¯, t, y
′, s)→ y=y′),
(8)
Duna ∪ DS0 |=
∃y(finit(x¯, s)=y ∧ ψf (x¯, start(s), y, s));
(9)
A set Dse of SEA (7) is stratified iff there are no temporal
fluents f1, . . . , fn such that f1 ≻ f2 ≻ . . . ≻ fn ≻ f1 where
f ≻ f ′ holds iff there is a SEA in Dse where f appears on
the left-hand side and f ′ on the right-hand side. A temporal
BAT is stratified iff its Dse is.
Similarly to Reiter’s BATs, temporal BATs have a relative
satisfiability property.
Theorem 2. A stratified temporal BAT D is satisfiable iff
Duna ∪ DS0 is satisfiable.
Proof (sketch). The proof extends that of Theorem 1 in
(Pirri and Reiter 1999). We start with a model M0 of
Duna ∪ DS0 and show how to build a model M of D.
LetM be constructed fromM0 as in Pirri and Reiter with
the additional condition that for each temporal fluent f ,
fM(x¯[v0], t[v0], S
M
0 ) = f
M0(x¯[v0], t[v0], S
M0
0 ), so that
D is satisfied by M at S0. Assume that M interprets all
symbols except temporal fluents at an arbitrary situation s.
For each temporal fluent f with SEA of the form (7), let
M, v |= f(x¯, t, s) = y iff M, v |= ψf (x¯, t, y, s). This is
well-defined because the right-hand side of the SEA for the
lowest-stratum temporal fluent does not mention other tem-
poral fluents and therefore has already been assigned a truth
value. The remaining temporal fluents are assigned values
by induction on strata. By (8), these values are unique and,
by (9), consistent with the discrete dynamics of temporal
fluents.
4 An Example
Consider a macroscopic urban traffic domain along the lines
of (Vallati et al. 2016). For simplicity, we consider a single
intersection of two 2-lane roads. Facing the intersection i
are 4 incoming and 4 outgoing road segments. Depending
on the traffic light, a car may turn left, turn right, or drive
straight from an incoming lane to the corresponding outgo-
ing lane. The layout of the intersection i is shown on Fig-
ure 1 (left). Each lane is denoted by a constant and each
path through the intersection i is encoded using the static
predicates st(i, r1, r2) (straight connection from lane r1 to
r2 at intersection i), lt(i, r1, r2) (left turn), and rt(i, r1, r2)
(right turn). The number of cars per unit of time that can
pass through each connection is specified by the function
flow(i, r1, r2).
The outgoing lanes are assumed to be of infinite ca-
pacity and are not modelled. The traffic lights are con-
trolled by a simple looping automaton with the states
Green(i, r, s) (from lane r, go straight or turn right), fol-
lowed by RArr(i, r, s) (right arrow, i.e., only turn right),
followed by Red(i, r, s) (stop), and then LArr(i, r, s) (left
arrow, i.e., only turn left), such that mutually orthogonal
directions are in antiphase to each other. The switching
between these states for all r is triggered by the action
switch(i, t) with precondition Poss(switch(i, t), s) ↔
start(s)≤ t via a set of simple SSA, e.g.,
Green(i, r, do(a, s))↔ a=switch(i, t) ∧ LArr(i, r, s) ∨
Green(i, r, s) ∧ a 6=switch(i, t).
These SSA ensure the correct order of signals as shown on
Figure 1 (right). To rule out multiple signals and maintain
the correct correspondence between the signals for intersect-
ing directions, we require that the initial state axioms entail
a set of simple state constraints.
out1
in1
out2 in2
out3
in3
out4in4 Green(i, r, s)
RArrow(i, r, s)
Red(i, r, s)
LArrow(i, r, s)
Figure 1: Intersection layout and the states of the traffic lights
The continuous quantity that we wish to model is the
number of cars queued up in each incoming lane. For that,
we use the temporal functional fluent que(i, r, t, s) and its
atemporal counterpart queinit(i, r, s) — the number of cars
at intersection i waiting in lane r in situation s at times t and
start(s), respectively. Since the lane r may run dry and thus
affect the continuous dynamics of queues, we call on the nat-
ural action empty(i, r, t) to change the relational state when
that happens:
Poss(empty(i, r, t), s)↔ start(s)≤ t ∧ que(i, r, t, s)=0,
a=empty(i, r, t) ∧ y=0→ queinit(i, r, do(a, s))=y,
a 6=empty(i, r, t) ∧ y=que(i, r, time(a), s)
→ queinit(i, r, do(a, s))=y.
The left-hand sides of the above effect axioms for queinit
are mutually exclusive, so the right-hand side of the SSA for
queinit(i, r, do(a, s)) is simply a disjunction thereof:
queinit(i, r, do(a, s))=y ↔ [a=empty(i, r, t) ∧ y=0] ∨
[a 6=empty(i, r, t) ∧ y=que(i, r, time(a), s)].
We can now formulate the TCA for que according to traf-
fic rules, i.e., cars move when they are allowed to. Cars do
not move at a red light, resulting in the simple TCA
[
Red(i, r, s) ∧ y=queinit(i, r, s)
]
→ que(i, r, t, s)=y.
When the signal for a non-empty lane r is the left arrow,
the queue of r decreases linearly from its initial size with the
rate associated with the left turn:
[
LArr(i, r, s) ∧ queinit(i, r, s) 6=0 ∧ ∃r
′[lt(i, r, r′) ∧
y=(queinit(i, r, s)−flow(i, r, r
′)·(t−start(s))]
]
→ que(i, r, t, s)=y.
The queue of a non-empty lane with signal RArr(i, r, s)
decreases similarly. For the signal Green(i, r, s), the queue
decreases with a combined rate of the straight connection
and the right turn:
[
Green(i, r, s) ∧ queinit(i, r, s) 6=0 ∧
∃r′∃r′′[st(i, r, r′) ∧ rt(i, r, r′′) ∧ y=(queinit(i, r, s)−
(flow(i, r, r′)+flow(i, r, r′′))·(t−start(s))]
]
→ que(i, r, t, s)=y.
From these TCA, by Theorem 1, we obtain a SEA (sim-
plified for brevity)
que(i, r, t, s)=y ↔ (∃τ∃q0∃rL∃rS∃rR).
τ=(t−start(s)) ∧ q0=queinit(i, r, s) ∧
lt(i, r, rL) ∧ st(i, r, rS) ∧ rt(i, r, rR) ∧[
LArr(i, r, s) ∧ q0 6=0 ∧ y=(q0−flow(i, r, rL) · τ) ∨
Green(i, r, s) ∧ q0 6=0 ∧
y=(q0−(flow(i, r, rS)+flow(i, r, rR)) · τ) ∨
RArr(i, r, s) ∧ q0 6=0 ∧ y=(q0−flow(i, r, rR) · τ) ∨
Red(i, r, s) ∧ y=q0 ∨
¬Red(i, r, s) ∧ q0=0 ∧ y=0
]
.
Notice that the last line comes not from the TCA but from
the explanation closure (4) enforced by Theorem 1 and as-
serts the constancy of que in the context which the TCA did
not cover (movement is allowed but the lane is empty).
In general, the modeller only needs to supply the TCA for
the contexts where the quantity changes with time.
5 Regression
Projection is a ubiquitous computational problem concerned
with establishing the truth value of a statement after execut-
ing a given sequence of actions. We solve it with the help
of regression. It turns out that the notions of uniform and
regressable formulas trivially extend to temporal BATs. In
this section, for the sake of simplicity and practicality, with-
out loss of generality, we assume that each regressable for-
mula can mention do only in a situation term or within the
function start in temporal arguments. The regression oper-
ator R as defined for atemporal BATs in Definition 4.7.4
of (Reiter 2001) can be extended to temporal BATs in a
straightforward way.WhenR is applied to a regressable for-
mula W , R[W ] is determined relative to a temporal BAT.
We extendR as follows.
Let D be a temporal BAT, and let W be a regress-
able formula. If W is a non-fluent atom that mentions
start(do(α, σ)), then R[W ] = R[W |
start(do(α,σ))
time(α) ]. If W
is a non-Poss atom and mentions a functional fluent uni-
form in σ, then this term is either atemporal or temporal.
The former case is covered by Reiter. In the latter case, the
term is of the form f(C¯, τ⋆, σ) and has a SEA f(x¯, t, s) =
y ↔ ψf (x¯, t, y, s), so we rename all quantified variables
in ψf (x¯, t, y, s) to avoid conflicts with the free variables of
f(C¯, τ⋆, σ) and defineR[W ] to be
R[∃y. (τ⋆=start(σ) ∧ y=finit(x¯, σ) ∨
τ⋆ 6=start(σ) ∧ ψf (C¯, τ
⋆, y, σ)) ∧W |f(C¯,τ
⋆,σ)
y ],
where y is a new variable not occurring free inW , C¯, τ⋆, σ.
Intuitively, this transformation replaces the temporal fluent
f with either the value of finit if f is evaluated at the time
of the last action or, otherwise, with the value determined by
the right-hand side of the SEA for f .
Theorem 3. IfW is a regressable sentence of SC and D is
a stratified temporal basic action theory, then
D |=W iff DS0 ∪ Duna |= R[W ].
Proof (sketch). The proof proceeds exactly like that of The-
orem 2 in (Pirri and Reiter 1999) with the following addi-
tion. Since the right-hand side of a SEA is uniform in s,
we only need to show that all occurrences in W of tempo-
ral fluents are eventually replaced with logically equivalent
expressions which can be regressed by usual means.
As long as variables are properly renamed, we have
D |= (∀)(W ↔ ∃y(ψf (C¯, τ
⋆, y, σ) ∧W |f(C¯,τ
⋆,σ)
y )).
By the property (9) of a temporal BAT, D |=
∃y.finit(x¯, s)=y ∧ ψf (x¯, start(s), y, s), so D entails
(∀)(W ↔ ∃y. (τ⋆= time(α) ∧ y=finit(x¯, do(α, σ)) ∨
τ⋆ 6= time(α) ∧ ψf (τ¯ , τ
⋆, y, σ)) ∧W |f(τ¯ ,τ
⋆,σ)
y ).
The formula W |
f(C¯,τ⋆,σ)
y mentions exactly one temporal
functional fluent fewer than W . Since Dse is stratified, the
formula ψf (C¯, τ
⋆, y, σ)) mentions temporal functional flu-
ents of a strictly lower stratum than f . Since W is a finite,
repeated application of temporal R to W involves a finite
number of steps and yields an expression (∃)(φ∧W ′)where
W ′ mentions no temporal fluents and φ mentions only tem-
poral fluents of a strictly lower stratum than the highest-
stratum temporal functional fluent of W . (Repeated appli-
cation of general R to W may raise the maximum stratum
of the expression due to temporal preconditions and context
conditions of SSA, but only finitely many times). After a
finite number of steps, regression arrives at an expression
which mentions no temporal fluents. Our theorem follows
by Theorem 3 of (Pirri and Reiter 1999).
Example (continued). Consider the example from the pre-
vious section. Observe that the only SEA of the theory is
stratified in that its right-hand side does not reference any
temporal fluents.
Let the initial state be noncontradictory and entail the fol-
lowing facts about S0:
start(S0) = 0, Red(I, in1, S0), queinit(I, in1, S0) = 100,
f low(I, in1, out2) = 5, f low(I, in1, out3) = 15,
f low(I, in1, out4) = 10.
Let W , the statement of interest, be que(I, in1, 3, σ) <
95, i.e., there are fewer than 95 cars in the incom-
ing lane in1 at time 3 in situation σ, where σ is
do([switch(I, 1), switch(I, 2)], S0). In this narrative, the
lane in1 initially sees the red light, which at t=1 switches
to the left arrow, and at t=2 to the green light.W is clearly
a regressable formula. To determine whetherW is entailed
by the theory, we can use Theorem 3 to reduceW to a log-
ically equivalent statement about the initial situation whose
entailment from DS0 ∪ Duna can be computed by FO the-
orem proving. (For brevity, we perform the following sim-
plifications on the formulas. First, we replace expressions
start(do(A(x¯, t), s)) = t′ by true (false) if t = t′ (t 6= t′).
Second, we replace relational fluents by their truth values if
they can be established by the usual atemporal regression.
Third, we exploit unique names for actions.)
R[que(I, in1, 3, σ) < 95] =
R[∃y∃q0(y<95 ∧ q0 6=0 ∧ y=q0−(15+5)(3− 2) ∧
q0=queinit(I, in1, do([switch(I, 1), switch(I, 2)], S0)))] =
R[∃y∃q0(y<95 ∧ q0 6=0 ∧ y=q0−(15+5)(3− 2) ∧
q0=que(I, in1, 2, do(switch(I, 1), S0)))] =
R[∃y∃q0(y<95 ∧ q0 6=0 ∧ y=q0−(15+5)(3− 2) ∧
∃y′∃q′0(q0=y
′ ∧ q′0 6=0 ∧ y
′=q′0−10(2− 1) ∧
q′0=queinit(I, in1, do(switch(I, 1), S0))))] =
R[∃y∃q0(y<95 ∧ q0 6=0 ∧ y=q0−(15+5)(3− 2) ∧
∃y′∃q′0(q0=y
′ ∧ q′0 6=0 ∧ y
′=q′0−10(2− 1) ∧
q′0=que(I, in1, 1, S0)))] =
∃y∃q0(y<95 ∧ q0 6=0 ∧ y=q0−(15+5)(3− 2) ∧
∃y′∃q′0(q0=y
′ ∧ q′0 6=0 ∧ y
′=q′0−10(2− 1) ∧
∃y′′(q′0=y
′′ ∧ y′′=queinit(I, in1, S0))))
The end result further simplifies to
queinit(I, in1, S0)− 10(2− 1)− (15 + 5)(3− 2) < 95,
which is a query about S0 and can be answered by plugging
100 for the initial number of cars at in1: 100−10−20 = 70,
which is strictly less than 95, so the statement is true.
In addition to computing entailment, regression can be a
powerful diagnostic tool. By analyzing the results of par-
tial regression of a regressable temporal query, it is pos-
sible to attribute its validity to a particular action of the
given sequence. Let Rσ
′
be a variant of R which does not
regress beyond σ′, i.e., Rσ
′
[W ] is uniform in σ′ if σ′ ⊑ σ
and W is uniform in σ. We can establish whether Rσ
′
[W ]
is true for each σ′ ⊑ do([switch(I, 1), switch(I, 2)], S0)
as just demonstrated (also using R). In our example,
the query holds continuously during and after the ac-
tion switch(I, 2) but is false before and at the instant of
the action switch(I, 1). We can conclude that the action
switch(I, 1) as well as the time that has passed since t=1
and up to the time whenRdo(switch(I,1),S0)[W ] became true
are responsible for the fact thatW holds at σ. In other words,
the fact that the traffic light changed from Red to LArr has
allowed cars to flow, and the subsequent passage of time
(which is easily computed to be equal to 0.5) caused the
query to hold. Recall that the query can be an arbitrary re-
gressable property of the continuous system.
6 Comparison with Previous Approaches
Considering that discrete-continuous systems have been a
hot topic for decades, it is impossible to fairly compare
hybrid situation calculus to a representative subset of all
work in that area. Hence, we draw comparisons only to ap-
proaches from the same paradigm.
AI proposals to formalize and reason about physical sys-
tems with hybrid temporal behaviours go at least as far
back as the work of (De Kleer and Brown 1984) on naı¨ve
physics. De Kleer and Brown model physical systems using
confluences—equations obtained from differential equations
by reducing them to only qualitative relationships between
quantities. (Sandewall 1989) points out that discarding in-
formation from a theory cannot lead to better inferences. He
argues that differential calculus is the perfect language for
modelling continuous change and that the essential task in
describing physical systems is to provide a logical founda-
tion for the discrete state transitions.
The work in (Pinto 1994; Pinto and Reiter 1995) presents
initial proposals to introduce time into the situation calcu-
lus; they focused on a so-called actual sequence of actions
and introduced representation for occurrences of actions wrt
an external time-line. Chapter 6 of (Pinto 1994) discusses
several examples of continuous change and natural events
following (Sandewall 1989), but without using Sandewall’s
non-monotonic solution to the frame problem. Also, it in-
troduces a new class of objects called parameters that are
used to name continuously varying properties such that each
parameter behaves according to a unique function of time
during a fixed situation. It is mentioned that parameters can
be replaced with functional fluents of time, but this direc-
tion was not elaborated. (Miller 1996) is another proposal
to represent continuous change in SC. Building on earlier
work of (Sandewall 1989; Pinto 1994), (Miller 1996) intro-
duces time-independent fluents and situation-independent
parameters that can be regarded as functions of time, but
provides only an example, and no general methodology.
(Reiter 1996) provides the modern axiomatization of time,
concurrency, and natural actions in SC, and it appears also
in (Reiter 2001). However, (Reiter 1996) allows only atem-
poral fluents in contrast to (Pinto 1994). For this reason,
(Soutchanski 1999) proposes an auxiliary action watch(t)
to monitor the execution of robot programs in real time.
The example in Section 4 helps illustrate the differ-
ences with our approach. Consider Reiter’s temporal SC
(Reiter 2001), which forms the backbone of ours. Since Re-
iter’s fluents are atemporal, the TCA above are replaced by
sets of effect axioms for the atemporal fluent que(i, r, s),
i.e.,
a=switch(i, t) ∧
[
LArr(i, r, s) ∧ que(i, r, s) 6=0 ∧ ∃r′[lt(i, r, r′) ∧
y=(que(i, r, s)−flow(i, r, r′)·(time(a)−start(s))]
]
→ que(i, r, do(a, s))=y.
Note that, in effect axioms, the change in que is asso-
ciated with a named action. The modeller must replicate
this axiom for each action which might affect the context
LArr(i, r, s) ∧ que(i, r, s) 6= 0, and likewise for all other
contexts and TCA. In our approach, the change in context
is handled separately and does not complicate the axioma-
tization of continuous dynamics. The right-hand side of the
resulting SSA
que(i, r, do(a, s))=y ↔
γque(i, r, y, s) ∨ que(i, r, s)=y ∧ ¬∃y
′γque(i, r, y
′, s)
can be obtained from the right-hand side of the SEA
above by replacing t with time(a), queinit(i, r, s) with
que(i, r, s), and the last line by the expression que(i, r, s)=
y ∧ ¬∃y′γque(i, r, y
′, s). Notice that the expression
γque(i, r, y, s) occurs twice — first thanks to the effect ax-
iom (in a normal form) and then again due to explanation
closure — see examples in Section 3.2.6 in (Reiter 2001).
In our approach, by Theorem 1, only the essential atemporal
part of that expression appears. Furthermore, Reiter’s ver-
sion of the precondition axiom for empty(i, r, t) is neces-
sarily cumbersome because it mentions que(i, r, t, s), whose
evolution (and thus the value at t) depends on the current re-
lational state of s. Therefore, the modeller must include the
right-hand side of the SSA in the precondition, thereby in-
creasing the size of the axioms by roughly the size of the
SSA for the continuous fluent F for every mention of F in a
precondition axiom while not adding any new information.
Moreover, since Reiter’s fluents are atemporal, evaluating
them at an arbitrary moment of time t requires an auxiliary
action.
The approach due to (Soutchanski 1999) introduces the
special actionwatch(t) whose purpose is to advance time to
the time-point t. This mechanism allows one to access con-
tinuous fluents in between the agent actions, but at a cost:
replacing que(i, r, t, s) by que(i, r, do(watch(t), s)) in the
precondition axiom makes the right-hand side non-uniform
in s, violates Defn. 4.4.3 in (Reiter 2001), and therefore
steps outside of the well-studied realm of basic action theo-
ries.
A proposal due to (Grosskreutz and Lakemeyer 2003)
considers continuous fluents of a different kind: their val-
ues range over functions of time, but neither the continuous
fluents nor the action symbols have a temporal argument.
Domain actions occur at the same time instant as the preced-
ing situation, and the mechanism for advancing time is the
special action waitFor(φ) which simulates the passage of
time until the earliest time point where the conditionφ holds,
where φ is a Boolean combination of comparisons between
values of continuous fluents and numerical constants. Aimed
specifically at robotic control, this approach relies on a cc-
Golog program to trigger the occurrence of the waitFor
action.
(Finzi and Pirri 2005) introduce temporal flexible situa-
tion calculus, a dialect aimed to provide formal seman-
tics and a Golog implementation for constraint-based inter-
val planning which requires dealing with multiple alternat-
ing timelines. To represent processes, they introduce fluents
with a time argument. However, this time argument marks
the instant of the process’ creation and is not associated with
a continuous evolution.
7 Modeling Hybrid Automata
Temporal BATs introduced here are naturally suitable for
capturing hybrid automata (Nerode 2007). Given an arbi-
trary basic hybrid automatonH , c.f., Section 2, we proceed
as follows. For every discrete state in the finite set Q, we in-
troduce a situation calculus constant qi with 1 ≤ i ≤ |Q|
and let DS0 contain unique name axioms for all qi. We
assume that the transition relation E is encoded by a fi-
nite set of static facts Edge(q, q′). Each flow ϕq is en-
coded by the situation-independent function flow such that
flow(q, x, t) = y iff ϕq(x, t) = y. Each set of invariant
states Invq is encoded by the static predicate Inv(q, x)
which holds iff x ∈ Invq . Each reset relation Rq,q′ is en-
coded by the static predicate Reset(q, q′, x, y) which holds
iff y ∈ Rq,q′ (x). The set of initial states Init is encoded by
the static predicate Init(q, x) which holds iff (q, x) ∈ Init.
Let trans(q, q′, y, t) be the only action symbol represent-
ing a transition from a discrete state q to a discrete state q′
at time instant t while resetting the continuous state to the
value y. Let the atemporal functional fluent Q(s) describe
the discrete state in situation s, and let the temporal func-
tional fluent X(t, s) describe the continuous state in situa-
tion s at time t. The dynamics of discrete state transitions
and the evolution of the continuous state variables can be
axiomatized as follows.
Poss(trans(q, q′, y, t), s)↔ Q(s)=q ∧ Edge(q, q′) ∧
∃x(X(t, s)=x ∧Reset(q, q′, x, y) ∧ Inv(q′, y)),
Q(do(a, s))=q ↔ ∃q′∃y∃t(a= trans(q′, q, y, t)) ∨
Q(s)=q ∧ ¬∃q′∃y∃t(a= trans(q, q′, y, t)),
Xinit(do(a, s))=x↔ ∃q∃q
′∃t(a= trans(q, q′, x, t)),
X(t, s)=x↔
∨k
i=1[Q(s)=qi ∧ x=flow(qi, Xinit(s), t).
The precondition axiom for trans states that a transition
from q to q′ while resetting continuous state to y is possible
at time t iff the current discrete state is q, there is an edge
from q to q′ in the graph, the reset relation determines the
new continuous state y, and the resulting state is legal. The
SSA for the discrete state asserts that q is the current state
iff we transition into it and do not transition out. The initial
value SSA for the continuous state forces Xinit to take on
the value prescribed by the reset relation. Finally, the con-
tinuous state evolves in each situation s starting with the ini-
tial value Xinit(s) according to the flow associated with the
current discrete state. The proposed translation is sound and
complete: see Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. Let D be a satisfiable temporal BAT axioma-
tizing a basic hybrid automaton H as described above, let
σ= do([α1, . . . , αn], S0) be an executable ground situation
term ofD, and τ a real number such that τ ≥ start(σ), i.e.,
τ is a time point after the last action αn of σ. Then
D |= Init(Q(S0), Xinit(S0)) ∧
(∀a, s, t)
[
do(a, s)⊑σ ∧ start(s)≤ t≤ time(a) ∨
s=σ ∧ start(σ) ≤ t ≤ τ
]
→ Inv(Q(s), X(s, t))
if and only if a finite trajectory of H can be uniquely con-
structed from σ and τ .
Proof. (Sketch.) Fix an arbitrary model M of D and con-
sider the sequence η=〈∆i, qi, νi〉i∈[1,n+1] such that
• ∆j =(time(αj)−start(σj))
M for each do(αj , σj) ⊑ σ
and∆n+1=τ−start(σ)
M;
• qj=Q(σj)
M for each do(αj , σj) ⊑ σ, qn+1=Q(σ)
M;
• νj = flow
M(qj , Xinit(σj)
M, t) for each do(αj , σj) ⊑ σ
and νn+1 = flow
M(qn+1, Xinit(σ)
M, t).
Clearly, η is finite. Since σ is executable, time(αi) ≥
start(σi), so the property (a) of a trajectory is satisfied, and
Σi∈I∆i is also finite. By the precondition of trans, we have
(e). Assuming M |= Init(Q(S0), Xinit(S0)), we have (d).
By (d) and the SSA forQ, we have (b). (c) follows from the
remainder of the premise and the SEA for X . Thus, η is a
finite trajectory of H . Conversely, if η is a finite trajectory
of H , then by (d) we have M |= Init(Q(S0), Xinit(S0)),
and by (c)–(e),M entails the remainder of the SC expres-
sion.
Clearly, this axiomatization of HA is a very special case
of a temporal BAT. It rules out any non-trivial queries about
the content of its states because its discrete states are a finite
set and there are no objects, let alone relations on objects. A
general temporal BAT does not have this limitation.
We conclude this section by observing that, while clas-
sic hybrid automata (Nerode 2007) are based on a finite
representation of states and atomic state transitions (apart
from the continuous component), richer representations be-
gan to attract the interest of the hybrid system community.
Of particular interest is the work by Platzer (Platzer 2010;
Platzer 2012b; Platzer 2017) based on first-order dynamic
logic (Pratt 1976; Harel, Kozen, and Tiuryn 2000) extended
to handle differential equations for describing continuous
change. The work presented here contributes to this line
of research by providing a very rich representation of the
discrete states described relationally through the richness
of Situation Calculus. Both (Platzer 2012a) and our paper
propose to go beyond hybrid automata with a finite num-
ber of states to hybrid systems where states may have com-
plex structure. The main difference between these two ap-
proaches is in the availability of situation terms. As a con-
sequence, the usual SC-based reasoning tasks (Reiter 2001)
can be easily formulated in our temporal BATs.
8 Conclusion
Inspired by hybrid systems, we have proposed a temporal
extension of SC with a clean distinction between atemporal
fluents, responsible for transitions between states, and new
functional fluents with a time argument, representing con-
tinuous change within a state.
In this paper we focused on semantics. However the con-
nection with Hybrid Systems established here opens new
perspectives for future work on automated reasoning as well.
In hybrid systems, the practical need for robust spec-
ification and verification tools for hybrid automata re-
sulted in the development of a multitude of logic-based ap-
proaches. An in-depth overview of logics for analyzing hy-
brid systems is given in (Davoren and Nerode 2000). More
recently, the results from (Gao, Avigad, and Clarke 2012b;
Gao, Avigad, and Clarke 2012a) show that that certain
classes of decision problems belong to reasonable com-
plexity classes. These results provide foundations for veri-
fication of robustness in hybrid systems (Kong et al. 2015).
Platzer’s work offers some decidability results for ver-
ification based on quantifier eliminations (Platzer 2010;
Platzer 2012a; Platzer 2017). Note that quantified differen-
tial dynamic logic, the variant of first-order dynamic logic
studied in (Platzer 2012a), which focuses on functions and
does not allow for arbitrary relations on objects, cannot en-
code situation calculus action theories in an obvious way.
For example, it includes only one low-level primitive action,
namely assignment, but the BATs provide agent actions that
can be used to model a system on a higher level of abstrac-
tion. Nevertheless, it may be interesting to study the reduc-
tions of fragments of Golog (Levesque et al. 1997) and ba-
sic action theories with or without continuous time to such a
dynamic logic, to exploit existing (Platzer 2012a) and future
decidability results.
On the other hand, while research in hybrid sys-
tems focuses on solving certain verification prob-
lems, the present paper, thanks to regression over
situations, proposes an approach to solve other rea-
soning problems that cannot be formulated in hy-
brid systems. Moreover, the recent work on bounded
theories (De Giacomo, Lespe´rance, and Patrizi 2016;
Calvanese et al. 2018) provides promising means to study
decidable cases in the realm of situation calculus, which
could be of interest to hybrid systems as well. This con-
ceptual interaction between hybrid systems and situation
calculus is an interesting avenue for future work.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Preliminaries
Temporal change axiom. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k for some k ≥ 1:
γi(x¯, s) ∧ δi(x¯, y, t, s)→ f(x¯, t, s)=y. (TCA)
Property of a well-defined TCA:
γi(x¯, s)→ ∃y δi(x¯, y, t, s). (WDP)
Positive normal form change axiom:
Φ(x¯, y, t, s)→ f(x¯, t, s)=y, (PNFCA)
where Φ(x¯, y, t, s) is
∨k
i=1 γi(x¯, s) ∧ δi(x¯, y, t, s).
Consistency axiom:
Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∧ Φ(x¯, y′, t, s)→ y=y′. (Cons)
Explanation closure axiom:
f(x¯, start(s), s) 6=f(x¯, t, s)→ ∃yΦ(x¯, y, t, s). (ECA)
Lemma 1. If D |= Cons, then a set S of temporal change axioms (TCA) can be syntactically transformed into another set S′
of TCA in which any two distinct contexts γa(x¯, s), γb(x¯, s) are mutually exclusive wrt D.
Proof. Suppose the set of TCA contains two axioms
γa(x¯, s) ∧ δa(x¯, y, t, s)→ f(x¯, t, s)=y, (10)
γb(x¯, s) ∧ δb(x¯, y, t, s)→ f(x¯, t, s)=y. (11)
with a 6= b such that D |= ∃x¯∃s(γa(x¯, s) ∧ γb(x¯, s)). By Cons,
γa(x¯, s) ∧ δa(x¯, y, t, s) ∧ γb(x¯, s) ∧ δb(x¯, y
′, t, s)→ y=y′,
i.e., whenever the premises of both axioms are satisfied, they must agree on y. Thus, we can replace equations (10), (11) with a
logically equivalent (wrt D ∧ Cons) set of new temporal change axioms
[γa(x¯, s) ∧ ¬γb(x¯, s)] ∧ δa(x¯, y, t, s)→ f(x¯, t, s)=y,
[¬γa(x¯, s) ∧ γb(x¯, s)] ∧ δb(x¯, y, t, s)→ f(x¯, t, s)=y,
[γa(x¯, s) ∧ γb(x¯, s)] ∧ δa(x¯, y, t, s)→ f(x¯, t, s)=y,
whose contexts are strictly mutually exclusive wrt D. By repeatedly applying this process to each pair of TCA whose contexts
are simultaneously satisfiable, we obtain a set of TCA whose contexts are pairwise mutually exclusive wrt D.
Henceforth, we assume that all contexts of TCA are pairwise mutually exclusive.
Theorem 1. If, for each TCA, the background theory D entails WDP, then the axioms PNFCA, ECA in the models of Cons are
logically equivalent to
f(x¯, t, s)=y ↔ [Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∨ y=f(x¯, start(s), s) ∧ ¬Ψ(x¯, s)],
where Ψ(x¯, s) denotes
∨
1≤i≤k γi(x¯, s), a disjunction of all contexts.
Derivation
Unless otherwise noted, we assume that all object assignments interpret the variables x¯, t, s arbitrarily and identically.
I. Negative normal form change axiom:
f(x¯, t, s)=y → ¬∃z(Φ(x¯, z, t, s) ∧ y 6=z). (NNFCA)
Cons ∧ PNFCA |= NNFCA.
Proof. NNFCA holds in a modelM under an object assignment σ iff, for every choice of object A ∈ R,
eitherM, σ(y 7→ A) |= f(x¯, t, s) 6=y Case 1
or there is no B 6= A in R such thatM, σ(y 7→ B) |= Φ(x¯, y, t, s). Case 2
Take arbitrary M, σ such that M, σ |= Cons ∧ PNFCA. Consider Cons. It holds in M under σ iff there is at most one
object Y ∈ R such thatM, σ(y 7→ Y ) |= Φ(x¯, y, t, s). If such Y does not exist, then NNFCA is satisfied through Case 2.
Otherise, If Y exists andM, σ |= PNFCA, thenM, σ(y 7→ Y ) |= f(x¯, t, s)= y. Since (f)M is a function, for all Z 6= Y ,
M, σ(y 7→ Z) |= f(x¯, t, s) 6=y, so NNFCA is satisfied throughCase 1. Since, for allZ 6=Y ,M, σ(y 7→ Z) |= ¬Φ(x¯, y, t, s),
NNFCA is satisfied through Case 2.
II. In the models of Cons and PNFCA, ECA is equivalent to either of
f(x¯, start(s), s)=y ∧ f(x¯, t, s) 6=y → ∃z(Φ(x¯, z, t, s) ∧ y 6=z), (ECA1)
f(x¯, start(s), s) 6=y ∧ f(x¯, t, s)=y → Φ(x¯, y, t, s). (ECA2)
Proof. ECA is satisfied in an arbitrary model M under an arbitrary assignment σ if and only if either
fM(σ(x¯), startM(σ(s)), σ(s)) and fM(σ(x¯), σ(t), σ(s)) coincide, or they are distinct (implying startM(σ(s)) 6= σ(t))
and there exists some Y ∈ R such that M, σ(y 7→ Y ) |= Φ(x¯, y, t, s). In the former case, ECA1 and ECA2 are trivially
satisfied as well. Let us consider the latter case.
Cons is satisfied in exactly those models M′ were there is at most one object Y ′ ∈ R such that M′, σ′(y 7→ Y ′) |=
Φ(x¯, y, t, s).
PNFCA is satisfied in exactly those models M′′ where, for all Y ′′ ∈ R, if M′′, σ′′(y 7→ Y ′′) |= Φ(x¯, y, t, s), then
M′′, σ′′(y 7→ Y ′′) |= f(x¯, t, s)=y.
NNFCA is satisfied in the models of Cons ∧ PNFCA (see I. above).
Let T1 6=T2 ∈ R such that start
M(σ(s))=T1 and σ(t) = T2. Let Y1 ∈ R such that Y1 = f
M(σ(x¯), startM(σ(s)), σ(s)).
Let Y2 ∈ R such that Y2 = f
M(σ(x¯), σ(t), σ(s)). Recall that Y1 6= Y2. Let σ
⋆ denote the assignment σ(t1 7→ T1, t2 7→
T2, y1 7→ Y1, y2 7→ Y2, y 7→ Y ).
We need to show that ECA1 and ECA2 are satisfied if and only if there exists some Y ∈ R such thatM, σ⋆ |= f(x¯, t1, s)=
y1 ∧ f(x¯, t2, s)=y2 ∧ Φ(x¯, y, t2, s).
Only if : By PNFCA, M, σ⋆ |= f(x¯, t2, s) = y, and since (f)
M is a function, Y and Y2 must coincide. Then M, σ
⋆ |=
f(x¯, t1, s) 6= y2 ∧ f(x¯, t2, s) = y2 ∧ Φ(x¯, y2, t2, s) and, since Y1 6= Y2, M, σ
⋆ |= f(x¯, t1, s) = y1 ∧ f(x¯, t2, s) 6= y1 ∧
∃yΦ(x¯, y, t2, s).
If : From ECA1, there exists some Z distinct from Y1 such that M, σ
⋆(z 7→ Z) |= Φ(x¯, z, t2, s). By PNFCA and Cons,
Z=Y , soM, σ⋆ |= f(x¯, t1, s)=y1 ∧ f(x¯, t2, s)=y2 ∧ ∃yΦ(x¯, y, t2, s). From ECA2,M, σ
⋆ |= Φ(x¯, y, t2, s). By PNFCA,
M, σ⋆ |= f(x¯, t2, s)=y andM, σ
⋆ |= f(x¯, t1, s) 6=y, soM, σ
⋆ |= f(x¯, t1, s)=y1∧f(x¯, t2, s)=y2∧∃yΦ(x¯, y, t2, s).
III. Syntactic variant of ECA1:
f(x¯, start(s), s)=y ∧ ¬∃z(Φ(x¯, z, t, s) ∧ y 6=z)→ f(x¯, t, s)=y. (ECA1*)
IV. PNFCA ∧ ECA1* is equivalent to
Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∨ [f(x¯, start(s), s)=y ∧ ¬∃z(Φ(x¯, z, t, s) ∧ y 6=z)]→ f(x¯, t, s)=y. (12)
V. Syntactic variant of ECA2:
f(x¯, t, s)=y → Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∨ f(x¯, start(s), s)=y. (ECA2*)
VI. In the models of Cons, ECA2* ∧ NNFC is equivalent to
f(x¯, t, s)=y → Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∨ [f(x¯, start(s), s)=y ∧ ¬∃z(Φ(x¯, z, t, s) ∧ y 6=z)]. (13)
Proof. ECA2* ∧ NNFC ≡
f(x¯, t, s)=y → [Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∨ f(x¯, start(s), s)=y] ∧ ¬∃z(Φ(x¯, z, t, s) ∧ y 6=z)
≡ f(x¯, t, s)=y → [Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∧ ¬∃z(Φ(x¯, z, t, s) ∧ y 6=z)] ∨
[f(x¯, start(s), s)=y ∧ ¬∃z(Φ(x¯, z, t, s) ∧ y 6=z)]
In the models of Cons, Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∧ ¬∃z(Φ(x¯, z, t, s) ∧ y 6=z) ≡ Φ(x¯, y, t, s), yielding RHS.
VII. (12) ∧ (13) is equivalent to
f(x¯, t, s)=y ↔ Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∨ [f(x¯, start(s), s)=y ∧ ¬∃z(Φ(x¯, z, t, s) ∧ y 6=z)]. (SEA1)
VIII. In the models of WDP and Cons, SEA1 is equivalent to
f(x¯, t, s)=y ↔ Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∨ [f(x¯, start(s), s)=y ∧ ¬
k∨
i=1
γi(x¯, s)]. (SEA2)
Proof. Take arbitraryM, σ such thatM, σ |= Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∨ [f(x¯, start(s), s)= y ∧ ¬∃z(Φ(x¯, z, t, s) ∧ y 6= z)]. All TCA
in Φ are mutually exclusive wrt D (see Lemma 1). Three cases are possible.
• M, σ |= γi(x¯, s) ∧ δi(x¯, y, t, s) for exactly one 1 ≤ i ≤ k andM, σ |= f(x¯, start(s), s) 6=y. In this case, the right-hand
side of the biequivalence SEA2 is also satisfied.
• M, σ |= ¬γi(x¯, s) ∨ ¬δi(x¯, y, t, s) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, so M, σ |= f(x¯, start(s), s) = y ∧ ¬∃z(Φ(x¯, z, t, s) ∧ y 6= z).
None of the TCA are in effect. The models of WDP forbid the case whereM, σ |= γi(x¯, s) butM, σ |= ¬δi(x¯, y, t, s),
meaning that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we haveM, σ |= ¬γi(x¯, s), so the right-hand side of the biequivalence SEA2 is satisfied.
• M, σ |= γi(x¯, s) ∧ δi(x¯, y, t, s) for exactly one 1 ≤ i ≤ k andM, σ |= f(x¯, start(s), s) = y. This is a boundary case
between the previous two: one TCA is in effect, but the value of y which it computes for x¯, t, s coincides with the initial
value of the fluent at f . In this case, the right-hand side of the biequivalence SEA2 is also trivially satisfied.
Now consider the opposite direction, from SEA2 to SEA1. Take arbitrary M, σ such that M, σ |= Φ(x¯, y, t, s) ∨
[f(x¯, start(s), s) = y ∧ ¬
∨k
i=1 γi(x¯, s)]. If M, σ |= Φ(x¯, y, t, s), then the right-hand side of SEA1 is satisifed. If
M, σ |= f(x¯, start(s), s) = y ∧ ¬
∨k
i=1 γi(x¯, s), then M, σ |= ¬Φ(x¯, y, t, s), so M, σ |= ¬∃z(Φ(x¯, z, t, s) ∧ y 6= z)],
and the right-hand side of SEA1 is satisifed.
